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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1992, the United States (“U.S.”) signed and ratified the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(“UNFCCC”).1 Under the UNFCCC, the U.S. is required, among 
other obligations, to (1) implement measures to mitigate climate 
change by addressing anthropogenic sources of emissions;2 (2) 
promote practices and processes that reduce or prevent emissions 
from all sectors;3 (3) promote sustainable management of sinks and 
reservoirs;4 (4) include climate change considerations in relevant 
social, economic, and environmental policies;5 (5) adopt policies to 
mitigate climate change by limiting emissions of greenhouse gases 
and by protecting sinks and reservoirs, with the aim of returning 
to 1990 emissions levels by 2000;6 and (6) identify and review 
domestic policies which encourage increased emissions of 
greenhouse gases.7 In 2016, the U.S. furthered its intent to 
mitigate climate change by signing the Paris Climate Agreement, 
whereby the U.S. pledged to decrease greenhouse gas emissions by 
26-28%  below the 2005 level before 2025.8 
Despite the growing understanding of the near- and long-term 
effects of climate change,9 the U.S. has struggled to meet its goals 
under the Paris Agreement because, at the federal level, the 
political branches of government have neglected to adopt adequate 
 
1. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 26, May 9, 1992, 
1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter Climate Change Framework]. 
2. Id. at art. 4(1)(b). 
3. Id. at art. 4(1)(c). 
4. Id. at art. 4(1)(d). 
5. Id. at art. 4(1)(f). 
6. Id. at art. 4(2)(a)–(b). 
7. Id. at art. 4(2)(e)(ii). 
8. U.S., U.S.A. FIRST N.D.C. SUBMISSION 1 (Mar. 9, 2016), 
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/United%20States
%20of%20America%20First/U.S.A.%20First%20NDC%20Submission.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FLB7-9G2Q]. 
9. See Summary for Policymakers of IPCC Special Report on Global Warming 
of 1.5°C, IPCC (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/2018/10/08/summary-for-
policymakers-of-ipcc-special-report-on-global-warming-of-1-5c-approved-by-
governments/ [https://perma.cc/A6HQ-FG4T] (determining that the severe 
impacts of climate change are already occurring and will exponentially increase 
if no action is taken). 
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climate laws.10 The U.S. Congress, for example, has failed to adopt 
any law to specifically control greenhouse gas emissions.11 
Likewise, the Executive Branch has demonstrated shortcomings in 
adopting climate-related initiatives. Although President Obama 
attempted to achieve greenhouse gas emission reduction through 
the Clean Power Plan, the courts have stayed this initiative,12 and 
after the current administration took office in 2016, President 
Trump has effectively withdrawn support for the Plan,13 
implemented policies to support continued reliance on fossil-fuel 
sources of energy,14 and officially started the proceedings to 
withdraw from the Paris Agreement.15 Due to the difficulties of 
implementing global climate policies and inaction at the federal 
level, an overarching legal regime to limit greenhouse gas 
emissions appears unachievable. And, despite the growing trend 
toward abating climate change at the state and local levels,16 
 
10. See generally Congress Climate History, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY 
SOLUTIONS, https://www.c2es.org/content/congress-climate-history/ 
[https://perma.cc/7NK9-AX2H]; see also Rep. of U.N. Env’t Programme, Emissions 
Gap Report 2018, at 9, 15, U.N. Doc. DEW/2210/NA (2018). 
11. See Congress Climate History, supra note 10. 
12. See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (Feb. 9, 2016) (mem.). 
Five separate but identical orders were issued in response to five separate 
applications to stay and many scholars have questioned the Court’s authority to 
stay the case due to the stay’s unprecedented nature. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, 
The Supreme Court’s Clean-Power Power Grab, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 425, 426 
(2016); Joshua Linn et. al., The Supreme Court’s Stay of the Clean Power Plan: 
Economic Assessment and Implications for the Future, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & 
ANALYSIS 10859, 10860 (2016).  
13. See generally Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093–97 (Mar. 31, 
2017) (replacing the Clean Power Plan with a fossil-fuel friendly initiative); see 
also Brad Plumer, What to Expect as U.S. Leaves Paris Climate Accord, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/us-paris-
accord-what-happens-next.html  [https://perma.cc/5CNS-G5AW] (explaining the 
national and international repercussions of Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement). 
14. See Proposal: Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution/proposal-affordable-clean-
energy-ace-rule [https://perma.cc/ZXZ9-AAKU] (last updated June 19, 2019) 
(describing the fossil-fuel friendly regulation which has been promulgated under 
President Trump’s first term).  
15. Drew Kann, US Begins Formal Withdrawal from Paris Climate Accord, 
CNN (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/04/politics/trump-formal-
withdrawal-paris-climate-agreement/index.html [https://perma.cc/E9ZG-ECTM]. 
16. See generally ALLIANCE FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE, MAYORS LEADING THE 
WAY ON CLIMATE: HOW CITIES LARGE AND SMALL ARE TAKING ACTION 9–20 (2018), 
http://www.usmayors.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/uscm-2018-alliance-
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/5
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climate initiatives foresee stabilization of global surface 
temperatures in the distant future, if at all. As a result, many 
jurisdictions, including cities, are currently experiencing the 
negative effects of climate change with no reasonable prospect for 
political redress.17 
Cities, therefore, have turned to judicial tribunals to obtain 
relief. Numerous cities within the U.S. have brought actions in 
federal courts across the nation seeking damages caused by climate 
change through the legal lens of common law torts.18 Originally, 
cities sought to bring actions against the major greenhouse gas 
emitters under the legal regime of the federal common law.19 In 
2011, however, the Supreme Court determined that these claims, 
with respect to defendants deemed domestic corporations, were 
displaced under the Clean Air Act.20 Consequently, cities have 
begun litigating climate actions against the oil companies who 
provide the fossil fuels used to produce greenhouse gases under 
state common law.21 Despite the high volume of climate actions 
entering the judicial system, almost all are being dismissed on 
jurisdictional grounds, without any discussion of the merits of their 
claims.22 
This Note delves into two of these common law nuisance 
actions in which district courts dismissed the City of Oakland’s and 
the City of New York’s claims that foreign and domestic oil 
companies caused city-wide damages by exacerbating the changing 
 
building-report-baldwin-small-7.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4QW-N8AQ]; see also 
John R. Nolon, Low Carbon Land Use: Paris, Pittsburgh, and the IPCC, 40 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 661, 678–91 (2018).  
17. ALLIANCE FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE, supra note 16, at 8. 
18. See, e.g., Amended Complaint at 7, City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. 
Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No: 2:18-CV-182-JFK) [hereinafter New York Am. 
Compl.]; First Amended Complaint at 2, City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. 
Supp. 3d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (No: 3:17-CV-06011-WHA) [hereinafter Oakland 
Am. Compl]. 
19. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 415 (2011).  
20. Id. at 424. 
21. New York Am. Compl., supra note 18, at 7; Oakland Am. Compl., supra 
note 18, at 2. 
22. See R. Henry Weaver & Douglas A. Kysar, Courting Disaster: Climate 
Change and the Adjudication of Catastrophe, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 295, 322 
(2017) (illustrating the judiciary’s “subterfuge and self-limitation” with respect to 
adjudicating the substantive claims of climate change plaintiffs). 
5
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climate system through their continuous sale of fossil fuels.23 
Instead of targeting the dismissal of domestic oil companies, where 
the current legal debate revolves around Clean Air Act preemption 
and displacement,24 this Note focuses on the dismissal of the 
claims with respect to foreign oil companies. Part II introduces the 
two climate nuisance suits and the district courts’ reasoning in 
dismissing the common law complaints against the domestic and 
foreign defendants. Part III then illustrates that the courts 
erroneously relied on statutory canons to analyze and dismiss the 
cities’ common law claims as they pertain to foreign defendants. 
Specifically, this section discusses the district courts’ misuse of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality to dismiss the common law 
claims against the foreign oil companies. The final jurisdictional 
hurdle that the courts must overcome before reviewing the 
allegations on their merits is determining which law applies, 
domestic law or foreign law. Therefore, Part IV explores the novel 
choice-of-law analysis in the context of climate nuisance actions 
and concludes that both federal and state choice-of-law principles 
dictate the use of U.S. law – whether state or federal – in the 
context of common law climate actions. This section concludes with 
the exploration of how the choice-of-law analyses further support 
the extraterritorial application of the common law. 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE COMMON LAW 
CLIMATE ACTIONS 
In 2018, two novel common law climate actions were brought 
in the District Court for the Northern District of California and the 
District Court for the Southern District of New York.25 In both 
cases, the cities of Oakland and New York brought public nuisance 
actions against domestic and foreign oil companies for causing city-
 
23. City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); 
City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1028–29 (N.D. Cal. 2018).  
24. See, e.g., Albert C. Lin & Michael Burger, State Public Nuisance Claims 
and Climate Change Adaptation, 36 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 49, 69 (2018). 
25. New York Am. Compl., supra note 18, at 1 (naming BP, Chevron, 
ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, and Royal Dutch Shell as defendants); Oakland Am. 
Compl., supra note 18, at 1 (naming BP, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, 
and Royal Dutch Shell as defendants). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/5
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wide damages as a result of their contributions to climate change.26 
Through their lawsuits, the cities attempted to expand upon the 
jurisprudence of transboundary harm27 by arguing for the 
extraterritorial application of recognized common law principles to 
hold foreign and domestic oil companies liable for localized 
damages caused by climate change.28 In both cases, the cities 
originally sought relief under the state common law.29 Both district 
courts, however, determined that the suits must be governed by 
federal common law because the climate nuisance claims are 
entrenched in transboundary emissions.30 State common law 
cannot apply, the courts reasoned, because controlling interstate 
pollution is a matter of federal law.31 Thus, “our federal system 
does not permit the controversy to be resolved under state law . . . 
because the interstate or international nature of the controversy 
makes it inappropriate for state law to control.”32 
Subsequently, the district courts easily dismissed the public 
nuisance claims against the domestic oil companies based on the 
Clean Air Act’s displacement of federal common law nuisance suits 
 
26. Three of these oil companies – Chevron, ConocoPhillips, and ExxonMobil 
– are domestic oil companies, while the other two – BP and Royal Dutch Shell – 
are foreign-based. See New York Am. Compl., supra note 17 at 8–9. 
27. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907) (applying 
common law principles to interstate pollution emitted from a finite copper 
refinery); see also Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 517 (1906) (applying common 
law principles to interstate pollution discharged from a discrete sewage channel). 
28. New York Am. Compl., supra note 18, at 1–2; Oakland Am. Compl., supra 
note 18, at 4–5. 
29. New York Am. Compl., supra note 18, at 1; Oakland Am. Compl., supra 
note 18, at 2. 
30. City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); 
Order Denying Motions to Remand at 3, City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. 
Supp. 3d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (No: 3:17-CV-06011-WHA). Currently, both cities 
have appealed this determination to the Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit, 
respectively. See, e.g., Appellant Brief at 29–42, City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 
325 F. Supp. 3d 466 (2d Cir. 2018) (No. 18-2188) [hereinafter Appellant Brief]. 
Instead of taking a position on this complex, article-worthy topic, this Note argues 
that in either situation the governing common law can apply extraterritorially. 
While other sources discuss the implications of preemption jurisprudence, this 
Note will not. See, e.g., Gil Seinfeld, Climate Change Litigation in the Federal 
Courts: Jurisdictional Lessons from California v. BP, 117 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 
25, 26 (2018).  
31. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 492 (1987); see also Illinois v. 
City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972) (“When we deal with air and water in 
their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal common law . . . .”). 
32. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).  
7
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involving emissions of greenhouse gas.33 Because the Clean Air Act 
only grants the EPA jurisdiction over regulating domestic 
greenhouse gas emissions,34 the district courts were unable to use 
the same displacement principles to dismiss the action against the 
foreign oil companies.35 Instead, the courts turned to separation of 
powers principles as a legal justification for the dismissal of the 
actions.36 
Climate change is global, and fossil fuels contribute to climate 
change and its resulting harms regardless of where they are 
extracted and ultimately combusted; thus, the Plaintiffs in the 
climate actions are seeking to hold multinational companies liable 
under their state common law or – if the state common law claims 
have been deemed federal common law claims – under U.S. federal 
common law for fossil fuel extraction and combustion activities 
that took place outside of the U.S.37 The courts seem to rely on the 
foreign aspect when invoking separation of powers to dismiss the 
cities’ claims against foreign corporations.38 Purporting to follow a 
string of recent Supreme Court cases,39 the courts reasoned that 
the judiciary should not “extend or create private causes of action 
even in the realm of domestic law,” for the “decision to create a 
private right of action is one better left to legislative 
judgment . . . .”40 Thus, the judiciary should be “wary of impinging 
 
33. City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 472; City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 
3d at 1024; see also Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011) 
(“We hold that the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any 
federal common-law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from 
fossil-fuel fired powerplants.”). 
34. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 425 (holding that the CAA “thus 
provides a means to seek limits on emissions of carbon dioxide from domestic 
powerplants”). 
35. City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475 (determining that “the Clean 
Air Act regulates only domestic emissions”); City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 
1024 (also determining that “foreign emissions are out of the EPA and Clean Air 
Act’s reach”). 
36. City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475–76; City of Oakland, 325 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1025. 
37. City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475; City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 
3d at 1026. 
38. City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475; City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 
3d at 1026. 
39. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013); Jesner v. Arab 
Bank, PLC., 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018).   
40. City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475 (quoting Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 
1402). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/5
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on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches,”41 
and, as a result, “federal courts should exercise great caution 
before fashioning federal common law in areas touching on foreign 
affairs.”42 Thus, the courts, in less than a page of discussion, use 
the extraterritorial effect of the cities’ claims as a means to dismiss 
the cases on separation of powers grounds.43 The issue of the 
extraterritorial application of the common law in the context of 
climate nuisance suits, however, is quite difficult and nuanced, 
warranting a more in-depth analysis. By analyzing the 
jurisprudence surrounding extraterritoriality in conjunction with 
the foundational principles of the common law, this Note argues 
that the courts erred in determining that the extraterritorial 
application of the common law in the context of climate nuisance 
suits violates separation of powers principles. 
III. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE 
COMMON LAW 
A. The Hesitation to Establish a New Field of Federal 
Common Law 
The district courts, when dismissing the climate nuisance 
actions, relied on the principle that the judiciary must exercise 
great caution before expanding the reach of the federal common 
law.44 The trio of cases which give life to this principle, however, 
involve interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”).45 The ATS 
has been described as a “legal Lohengrin,” in that its existence is 
hard to trace.46 The creation of the ATS dates back to the 
enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789, whereby Congress included 
a provision that bestowed upon the federal courts jurisdiction over 
certain subject matters; thus, the ATS is merely a jurisdictional 
 
41. Id. (citing Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1402 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 
542 U.S. 692, 727)).  
42. City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1028. 
43. See, e.g., City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475–76. 
44. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712; see Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124; see Jesner, 138 S. 
Ct. at 1403.  
45. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018) (“The district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed 
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”).  
46. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712 (quoting IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 
(2d Cir. 1975)). 
9
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statute.47 In fact, during the first 170 years after the enactment of 
the ATS, plaintiffs invoked its jurisdiction only once.48 
The trilogy of Supreme Court cases relied upon by the district 
courts all involve whether a cause of action is allowed under the 
ATS.49 The first case, Sosa, produced a unanimous decision in 
which the Court determined that the ATS does not create a private 
right of action; rather, the statute merely provides a forum in 
which foreign plaintiffs may seek redress.50 Because the ATS had 
only been invoked once previously,51 the Supreme Court proceeded 
to conduct an in-depth historical analysis of the statute to identify 
which causes of action could be brought under the ATS’s 
jurisdiction.52 The Court ultimately found that the ATS “enabled 
federal courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined by 
the law of nations and recognized at common law.”53 Thus, the 
majority, echoed by Justice Scalia in concurrence, determined that 
for a claim resting on a tort in violation of international law to be 
valid under the ATS, the claim must (1) rest on a violation of 
customary international law; and (2) be defined with specificity 
comparable to violations of international law existing at the time 
of the ATS’s enactment.54 Consequently, the Court interpreted the 
ATS to limit the judiciary’s power in expanding the statute’s 
jurisdictional scope.55 
Nearly a decade later, the Supreme Court reiterated its 
hesitance to allow judicial expansion of the ATS.56 In Kiobel, the 
plaintiffs, a group of Nigerian nationals residing in the U.S., 
brought an action under the ATS against Dutch, British, and 
Nigerian corporations for alleged violations of the law of nations.57 
Unlike Sosa, where the Court grappled with whether the claim was 
 
47. Id. at 712–13 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350). 
48. Id. 
49. See id. at 712; Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 114; Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1394. 
50. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724. 
51. Id. at 712. 
52. See id. at 712–38.   
53. Id. at 712. 
54. Id. at 725. This is commonly known as the Sosa test.  
55. The door to litigation under the ATS has not been closed; rather, “the 
door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class 
of international norms today.” Id. at 729. 
56. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117–16 (2013).  
57. Id. at 111–12. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/5
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valid under the ATS, in Kiobel, the question before the Court was 
whether the ATS geographically reaches conduct that occurred in 
another sovereign state.58 Simply put, the Court granted certiorari 
to decide whether the ATS allowed federal courts to adjudicate 
foreign conduct that occurred between aliens.59 Recognizing that 
courts ultimately determine the geographic and jurisdictional 
reach of the ATS, the Supreme Court utilized the presumption 
against extraterritoriality – a canon of statutory interpretation 
stating that a statute that fails to clearly indicate an 
extraterritorial application has none60 – to conclude that the ATS’s 
jurisdiction failed to encompass defendants’ violation of a law of 
nations occurring in a sovereign outside the U.S.61 Because “the 
danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of 
foreign policy is magnified . . .  [where] the question is not what 
Congress has done but instead what courts may do,” the Supreme 
Court refused to expand the ATS’s jurisdiction in such a manner.62 
In other words, in the context of the ATS, courts have the power to 
interpret Congress’s delegation of jurisdiction to the judiciary, 
specifically the geographic reach of ATS jurisdiction.63 
Six years after the Supreme Court issued its Kiobel opinion, 
the Court, in Jesner, again invoked judicial restraint, this time to 
limit the availability of ATS causes of action that may implicate 
foreign policy considerations.64 The petitioners invoked the 
jurisdiction of the ATS, claiming that officials of a Jordanian bank 
had allowed transfers of funds to terrorist groups, who then used 
those funds to cause the deaths and injuries for which the plaintiffs 
 
58. Id. at 115.  
59. Michael L. Jones, Note, Domesticating the Alien Tort Statute, 84 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 95, 106 (2016). 
60. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010); see also 
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454–55 (2007) (explaining that the 
presumption assures that the “United States law governs domestically but does 
not rule the world”). 
61. See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 116 (“[w]e think the principles underlying the 
canon of interpretation similarly constrain courts considering causes of action 
that may be brought under the ATS.”); see also Jordan Clark, Note, Kiobel’s 
Unintended Consequences: The Emergence of Transnational Litigation in State 
Court, 41 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243, 255 (2014). 
62. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 109. 
63. See id. at 116. 
64. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC., 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407–08 (2018). 
11
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sought compensation.65 The key issue in this case, left unanswered 
in the Kiobel opinion, was whether the ATS’s jurisdiction 
encompasses actions against foreign corporations.66 Utilizing 
historical analyses, canons of statutory interpretation, and 
rationales for judicial restraint employed in Sosa and Kiobel, the 
Supreme Court, with a slim five-to-four advantage, concluded that 
the ATS’s jurisdiction does not include claims brought against 
foreign corporations.67 
The trio of cases caution the judiciary against broadening the 
jurisdictional scope of the ATS when interpreting the statute.68 
The district courts in the recent climate nuisance cases, however, 
saw more than mere interpretations of the ATS. Instead, the 
district courts determined that the trio illustrates a broader 
cautionary tale against judicial action “in the face of ‘serious 
foreign policy consequences.’”69 Specifically, the district courts 
latched onto the language of and theory behind the Sosa, Kiobel, 
and Jesner cases concerning extraterritorial application of U.S. law 
to dismiss the common law climate actions.70 The courts opined 
that because the essence of the nuisance claims derives from the 
global emission of greenhouse gases and because this type of claim 
implicates numerous sources of foreign authority, the 
extraterritorial application of the common law would cause 
“significant foreign relations implications,” which conflict with the 
unequivocal warning expressed by Sosa, Kiobel, and Jesner.71 The 
district courts, however, failed to elaborate on one paramount 
difference between the trilogy of cases and the climate nuisance 
suits. Although the claims in Sosa, Kiobel, and Jesner were 
 
65. Id. at 1393. 
66. Id. at 1395. 
67. See generally id. Although the Jesner opinion was a plurality opinion, a 
majority of Justices concluded that ATS jurisdiction does not reach to foreign 
corporations. 
68. It is important to note that the Supreme Court, in the trio of cases, was 
not limiting the territoriality of the common law claims; rather, the Court merely 
determined whether specific claims fall within the ATS’s jurisdictional 
boundaries. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004); see Kiobel, 
569 U.S. at 124; Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1407-08. 
69. City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 
(quoting Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1407). 
70. See e.g., City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1025 (N.D. 
Cal. 2018) (quoting Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 117). 
71. City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/5
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common law claims, these claims arose under the specific 
jurisdiction of the ATS, which is based on Congressional delegation 
of jurisdiction to the judiciary.72 The climate nuisance suits, in 
contrast, solely offer common law claims without any connection to 
a statutory legal regime.73 Therefore, the courts ignored the stark 
contrast between claims arising purely under the common law and 
claims arising under statutory law.74 
By failing to recognize that common law claims differ greatly 
from their statutory counterparts, the courts incorrectly concluded 
that the adjudication of climate nuisance suits would cause serious 
foreign policy conflicts. The common law differs fundamentally 
from statutory law and its extraterritorial application will not 
produce the same foreign policy concerns.75 Long-standing, 
foundational principles of the common law allow for the 
extraterritorial application of the common law claims in the 
context of climate nuisance suits without encroaching on the 
powers of the political branches of government. 
B. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Does 
Not Apply to Common Law Nuisance Suits 
The presumption against extraterritoriality has existed in 
American jurisprudence “for nearly as long as there have been 
federal statutes.”76 Nevertheless, despite the waxing and waning 
of this principle’s application and the changes in its definition, the 
presumption has only been applied to the construction of 
statutes.77 Instead of allowing judges to guess whether Congress 
would allow for extraterritoriality in a certain context, the 
presumption prevents “judicial-speculation-made-law” by only 
allowing extraterritorial application when Congress unequivocally 
 
72. See Ingrid Wuerth, The Future of the Federal Common Law of Foreign 
Relations, 106 GEO. L.J. 1825, 1833 (2018). 
73. See, e.g., New York Am. Compl., supra note 18, at 68–73. 
74. See City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475–76; City of Oakland, 325 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1024–28. 
75. See discussion infra Section III.B, IV.C. 
76. William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 85 (1998).  
77. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (citing 
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932) (“This principle represents a 
canon of construction, or a presumption about a statute’s meaning, rather than a 
limit upon Congress’s power to legislate.”).  
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expresses an affirmative intention to give the statute 
extraterritorial effect.78 Thus, the presumption prevents the 
judiciary from expanding the reach of statutory law beyond the 
legislative intent. 
It has been suggested that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality derives from a policy of preventing judicial 
interference with foreign affairs through court-made geographic 
extensions of U.S. law.79  In fact, it is this argument that the 
district courts relied on in applying the presumption to common 
law nuisance claims.80 In the City of Oakland, the court applied a 
heightened level of caution which paralleled that of Kiobel.81 The 
Supreme Court in Kiobel determined that judicial interference is 
more dangerous when the courts are deciding what they may do.82 
This danger, however, relates to the judiciary’s role under the ATS 
to determine the jurisdictional reach of the statute. In Sosa, Kiobel, 
and Jesner, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining 
whether the substantive claims at issue were subject to ATS 
jurisdiction.83 With jurisdictional statutes such as the ATS, the 
court retains the ability to significantly expand or limit the 
substantive reach of the statute. Thus, the courts reason that 
caution is warranted to prevent judicial overreach. 
Some scholars, although agreeing that the extraterritorial 
application of statutes will cause judicial interference in the realm 
of foreign policy, disagree that the common law must be similarly 
restricted.84 Specifically, because the common law represents a 
fundamentally unique form of law, one which has key distinctions 
from its statutory counterpart, its extraterritorial application will 
not cause similar concerns.85 
 
78. Id. at 261. 
79. Anthony J. Colangelo, What is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 99 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1303, 1351 (2014).  
80. City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); 
City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
81. City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1025. 
82. Id. (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 116 
(2013)).  
83. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004); Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 
112–13; Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1394 (2018). 
84. Jeffrey A. Meyer, Extraterritorial Common Law: Does the Common Law 
Apply Abroad?, 102 GEO. L.J. 301, 335 (2014). 
85. Id. 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/5
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1. The Common Law as “Common,” “Constrained” 
and the Law of the “Commoner” 
When rejecting application of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality to judge-made common law, then-professor 
Jeffrey Meyer illustrated three key distinctions between the 
common law and its statutory counterpart.86 Namely, the common 
law is “common,” “constrained,” and the law of the “commoner.”87 
In other words, the common law applies principles which 
transcend geographic boundaries, is derived from the “customs and 
relations of the common people, rather than being legislatively 
ordained,” and, is “subject to long-established practices” that 
systemically restrain its change more than statutes.88 Already, 
multiple courts have rejected attempts to limit the geographic 
reach of common law principles abroad.89 
Tort law has long been applied in the extraterritorial context 
due to its “common” nature. Justice Holmes acknowledged this 
possibility by stating that “[g]enerally speaking, as between two 
common-law countries, the common law of one reasonably may be 
presumed to be what it is decided to be in the other, in a case tried 
in the latter state,” while “a statute of one would not be presumed 
to correspond to a statute in the other . . . .”90 Even for non-
common law countries, “[t]here is every reason why [other 
countries] should be presumed to recognize fundamental principles 
of right and wrong which lie at the foundation of human society,” 
 
86. In 2014, Professor Meyer was appointed to the U.S. District Court of 
Connecticut. Ana Radelat, Senate Confirms Meyer for District Court, CT MIRROR 
(Feb. 24, 2014), https://ctmirror.org/2014/02/24/senate-confirms-meyer-for-
district-court/ [https://perma.cc/M3JY-GHZ7]. 
87. Meyer, supra note 84, at 307. 
88. Id. 
89. See, e.g., Jovic v. L–3 Servs., Inc., 69 F. Supp. 3d 750, 762–64 (N.D. Ill. 
2014) (determining that the common law can be applied even if the conduct 
occurred outside of the state that accepts such common law principles); see also 
Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Blavatnik, No. 650591/11, 2015 WL 5057693, at *23  
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 25, 2015) (“New York courts have historically found that there 
is no territorial limit to New York common law causes of action, as there is with 
federal and state statutes.”). Additionally, two recent courts declined to apply the 
presumption to common law claims because the Defendants failed to cite 
authority supporting the application. See Armada (Singapore) Pte Ltd. v. Amcol 
Int’l Corp., 244 F. Supp. 3d 750, 758 (N.D. Ill. 2017); Leibman v. Prupes, No. 2:14-
CV-09003, 2015 WL 3823954, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2015). 
90. Cuba R.R. Co. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 479 (1912). 
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so that “if one should sue for damages suffered from an assault and 
battery, or from a larceny committed” in a foreign country, then 
“[t]here ought to be a presumption from common knowledge that a 
liability exists everywhere in such cases.”91 Thus, when “common” 
principles lay the foundation for the common law, courts need not 
hesitate to apply it extraterritorially.92 
Additionally, unlike statutory law, common law is 
“constrained” by the past.93 Although many legal realists see the 
common law as judge-made law which parallels the legislative 
process, common law judges operate quite differently.94 Instead of 
enacting broad policy like legislators, common law judges are 
constrained to specific dispute resolution.95 The common law 
depends upon “conformity with the past” and what is “transmitted 
through time as a received body of knowledge and learning.”96 
 
91. Parrot v. Mex. Cent. Ry. Co., 93 N.E. 590, 593 (Mass. 1911); see also Bank 
of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 535–36 (1839) (“The common law is said to be 
‘common right’. . . . In all civilized nations, this law is substantially the same. 
Even in nations not admitted to be within that description, there is a strong 
resemblance: for example, in the laws of the Hindoos. The reason is obvious. 
Whether expounded in codes, or disclosed by judicial investigation and decision, 
the great principles of justice are identical; and it is the aim of all law to cultivate, 
extend, and enforce them. Statutes are but few in comparison. They are 
exceptions; the common law is the great body. The legislator acts chiefly upon 
matters which are indifferent.”). 
92. See Meyer, supra note 84, at 340. In response to Professor Meyer’s article, 
some critics have pointed to numerous examples wherein conflicts of similar 
common law principles still arise. See Zachary D. Clopton & P. Bartholomew 
Quintans, Extraterritoriality and Comparative Institutional Analysis: A Response 
to Professor Meyer, 102 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 28, 29–30 (2013) (citing BRAINERD 
CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAW 107–10 (1963)). Obviously, 
these situations may occur, but, in the vast majority, the multiple common laws 
do not conflict and are thus “common.” 
93. Meyer, supra note 84, at 307. 
94. Id. at 342–43. 
95. Id. at 343; see also Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law 
Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 593 (2006) (“Common law judges of earlier eras 
themselves reinterpreted received precedents with an eye toward their own 
situations . . . .”). 
96. Brian Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY 
AND COMMON LAW 8, 20 (William Twining ed., 1986). Instead of the top-down 
approach of legislators, the common law derives bottom-up from long-established 
customs and principles. See COMMON LAW THEORY 173 (Douglas E. Edlin ed., 
2007) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
68–70 (Oxford Uni. Press, 1765)) (“[T]he root  of common law . . . was ancient 
custom, custom so long established that ‘the memory of man runneth not to the 
contrary.’”)). 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/5
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Simply put, statutory law reflects a majoritarian model whereby a 
simple majority of legislators is required to define the law,97 while 
common law reaches beyond the majoritarian outlook to include 
the traditions of the minority when determining the law.98 
Also, the common law is not an expression of legislative 
intent.99 Rather, it arose independent of geographic considerations 
and political figures to reflect people’s relationships with one 
another.100 As such, the common law system evolved into: 
[A] customary system of law in this sense, that it consists of a body 
of practices observed and ideas received over time by a caste of 
lawyers, these ideas being used by them as providing guidance in 
what is conceived to be the rational determination of disputes 
litigated before them, or by them on behalf of clients, and in other 
contexts.101 
It was Chief Justice John Marshall who stated that “[w]hen our 
ancestors migrated to America, they brought with them the 
common law of their native country,” and “[i]n breaking our 
political connection with the parent state, we did not break our 
connection with each other.”102 And so the common law can be 
 
97. See A.C. Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An 
Economic Analysis of Tradition’s Role in Constitutional Interpretation, 77 N.C. L. 
REV. 409, 419–420 (1999). 
98. See id. at 440.  
99. “[T]he ‘commonsense notion [is] that Congress generally legislates with 
domestic concerns in mind.’” Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388 (2005) 
(quoting Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993)). 
100. See ALAN BRUDNER, THE UNITY OF THE COMMON LAW 1–2 (U.C. Press, 
1995) (explaining the origins of the common law as a framework of interactions 
designed to meet common goals without political discourse); Meyer, supra note 
84, at 342. 
101. Simpson, supra note 96, at 20. 
102. Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660, 665 (C.C.D. Va. 1811). In further 
support of this notion, carved onto the external walls of the Department of Justice 
in Washington, D.C. is the quote “[t]he common law derives from the will of 
mankind, issuing from the life of the people, framed by mutual confidence, and 
sanctioned by the light of reason.” See Robert Farley, Chain E-mail Claims a 
Quote at the Top of the Redesigned Department of Justice Website Comes from a 
Socialist Who Wanted to Impose Global Common Law, POLITIFACT (July 14, 2011), 
https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2011/jul/14/chain-
email/chain-e-mail-claims-quote-top-redesigned-departmen/ 
[https://perma.cc/G5XJ-LAZB?type=image] (explaining the location and the 
history of the quotation).  
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deemed the law of the “commoner” because it is derived from the 
relationships amongst the people sans geographic limitations.103 
2. Climate Nuisance Suits as “Common,” 
“Constrained,” and the Law of the “Commoner” 
The district courts in City of Oakland and City of New York 
were correct when stating that courts should be wary of extending 
the common law beyond its intended reach. This restraint, 
however, should not derive from a fear of foreign affairs 
implications caused by extraterritoriality; rather, the caution 
should arise only where there is a deviation from longstanding 
foundations of the common law. Because nuisance suits relating to 
climate change embody the three unique characteristics of the 
common law, such suits are distinguishable from statutory claims 
made under the ATS, and therefore the courts should be permitted 
to adjudicate these suits in the extraterritorial context. The tort of 
nuisance is “common” because in relevant international 
jurisdictions, it has been recognized as a valid claim. In both 
climate nuisance suits, the cities brought actions against Royal 
Dutch Shell and BP, companies headquartered in the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom, respectively.104 In the United Kingdom, 
nuisance law has been used for hundreds of years as a means for 
the protection of property rights, including in the transnational 
context.105 In the Netherlands, nuisance law has been utilized for 
the same purpose.106 Thus, the potential for foreign affairs 
implications in these climate nuisance suits as voiced by the 
district courts107 is misguided due to the commonality of nuisance 
suits between these sovereign states. 
 
103. Meyer, supra note 84, at 307. 
104. See New York Am. Compl., supra note 18, at 8–9. 
105. See Elena Merino Blanco & Ben Pontin, Litigating Extraterritorial 
Nuisances Under English Common Law and UK Statute, 6 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 
285, 285 (2016). 
106. See Hof’s-Gravenhage 9 oktober 2018, AB 2018, 417 m.nt. GA van der 
Veen, Ch.W. Backes (Staat der Nederlanden/Stichting Urgenda) [hereinafter 
Urgenda Decision]. 
107. City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 
(“To litigate such an action for injuries from foreign greenhouse gas emissions in 
federal court would severely infringe upon the foreign-policy decisions that are 
squarely within the purview of the political branches of the U.S. Government.”); 
City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1029 (N.D. Cal 2018) (“The 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/5
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The locality of harm alleged by the cities illustrates the 
“constrained” aspect of climate nuisance suits. The cities are trying 
neither to regulate the world’s greenhouse gas emissions nor to 
chastise the burning of fossil fuels to harness necessary forms of 
energy and electricity. Instead, the cities are attempting to obtain 
monetary relief for the damages caused to their municipal regions 
because of the activities of the oil companies.108 Thus, the courts 
must not view these adjudications as ones which will send 
shockwaves throughout U.S. foreign policy; rather, the courts must 
view the claims as what they are – claims for relief for the damages 
caused by interference of rights common to the general public of 
those municipalities.109 The district courts reasoned that because 
climate nuisance suits will involve the balancing of competing 
interests – namely, the balance between environmental protection 
and the continued use of fossil fuels as a source of energy – this 
balancing should be left to Congress.110 Even though most 
nuisance suits involve the balancing of interests,111 which is a form 
of policymaking, in the context of climate nuisance suits, 
completion of a nuisance analysis may not require such 
balancing.112 Therefore, the fact that climate nuisance suits 
 
problem [of climate change] deserves a solution on a more vast scale than can be 
supplied by a district judge or jury in a public nuisance case.”). 
108. New York Am. Compl., supra note 18, at 73–74; Oakland Am. Compl., 
supra note 18, at 55. 
109. Weaver & Kysar, supra note 22, at 354 (explaining how the “nihilistic 
judge” abdicates their duty in the face of a grand and complex nature of the 
problem). The relevant inquiry is whether the statute should apply domestically, 
which requires the determination of the statute’s focus.  WesternGeco LLC v. ION 
Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2136–37 (2018) (alterations omitted) (quoting 
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016), and Morrison 
v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 267 (2010)). 
110. City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 475–76; City of Oakland, 325 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1027. 
111. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821A–F (AM. LAW 
INST. 1979). 
112. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 369–71 (2d Cir. 
2011), rev’d on other grounds, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (determining that the City of 
New York pleaded a valid public nuisance claim for damages caused by climate 
change). In addition, the Restatement has included a non-balancing test, referred 
to as the “moral outrage” test, whereby an invasion is unreasonable if the harm 
it causes is “severe and greater than the other should be required to bear without 
compensation.” ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, 
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 78 (8th ed. 2018) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 829A). 
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present the possibility for a larger, more impactful decision should 
not suppress a court’s ability to hear the matter. Even so, 
adjudication in this context does not necessarily involve the 
balancing of environmental protection and fossil fuel energy; 
rather, it presents the fossil fuel industry’s crippling effects on 
coastal cities.113 The cities are not seeking to end the use of fossil 
fuels or promote worldwide environmental protection with these 
suits. Instead, these suits seek reimbursement for the millions of 
dollars spent repairing the damages caused by climate change.114 
Therefore, despite the assumption that these suits involve the 
immense policy decision of balancing environmental protection 
with continued fossil fuel use, these suits actually represent a 
constrained action to recover localized damages. Additionally, 
these claims do not present novel arguments for which there is no 
precedent. Nuisance claims have long been used as a means to 
address localized harm to the enjoyment of private or public 
property.115 Therefore, the use of judicial restraint to bar valid and 
justifiable climate nuisance claims stands without merit.116 
Instead, it reflects the current trend of the judiciary to dismiss 
valid claims associated with climate change without reviewing the 
merits.117 
Climate nuisance suits represent the law of the “commoner” 
despite the relatively new nature of climate change. Nuisance 
claims purport to protect an individual’s right to use and enjoy her 
property or to protect rights common to the general public.118 In 
the context of climate nuisance suits, the property of municipalities 
 
113. See New York Am. Compl., supra note 18, at 32–34; Oakland Am. 
Compl., supra note 18, at 45–50. 
Additionally, the claims are intertwined with the fact that the energy companies 
misrepresented the causes and impacts of climate change to the public. See James 
Weinstein, Climate Change Disinformation, Citizen Competence, and the First 
Amendment, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 342, 342–45 (2018). 
114. New York Am. Compl., supra note 18, at 73–74; Oakland Am. Compl., 
supra note 18, at 55. 
115. See, e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 244–45 (1901) (public 
nuisance); Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658, 666 
(Tenn. 1904) (private nuisance). 
116. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 321–32 (determining that although 
common law climate actions present difficult and complex questions, the court 
must not yield because of this difficulty).  
117. Weaver & Kysar, supra note 22, at 322–23. 
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821B, 822 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/5
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have been destroyed or significantly damaged because of human-
created climate change.119 Although climate change may appear 
massive in scale, the root of the cities’ claims derive from localized 
harms allegedly caused by private parties. Nuisance suits are 
notorious for varying in scale, from claims as small as a neighbor 
damaging a homeowner’s trees120 to more sizeable claims such as 
the contamination of large cities’ drinking water supply.121 What 
remains constant throughout every suit, however, is the localized 
relationship between the individual and the harm.122 People and 
communities have utilized the foundations of nuisance law to 
protect their property interest for hundreds of years. Thus, 
nuisance suits, even when applied on the grand scale of climate 
change, must be viewed as the law of the “commoner.” And 
although climate nuisance suits are grand in scale, the courts must 
not shy away from adjudicating valid claims on cautionary 
grounds. 
The “common,” “constrained,” and “commoner” characteristics 
of climate nuisance suits illustrate why the district courts’ 
application of the judicial caution laid out in Sosa, Kiobel, and 
Jesner cannot apply. Rather, the courts should have understood 
that the U.S. common law can be extended extraterritorially.123 
 
119. New York Am. Compl., supra note 18, at 23; Oakland Am. Compl., supra 
note 18, at 45–51. 
120. Stevens v. Moon, 202 P. 961, 962 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921). 
121. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 219 (1901).  
122. The distinction between ATS litigation and common law climate 
nuisance suits is further supported by the fact that suits arising under the ATS 
often involve foreign parties, conduct in foreign jurisdictions, and harms 
experienced outside of the US. See generally Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 
692, 720 (2004); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 123 (2013); 
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1388 (2018). In contrast, the common 
law climate actions here involve local harm and local plaintiffs.  
123. Another key factor to consider when analyzing whether the common law 
can apply abroad is Due Process constraints. In All State Ins., Co. v. Hague, the 
Supreme Court determined, with respect to the extraterritoriality of state law, 
the Due Process Clause prevents state courts from applying common law claims 
in the absence of any “significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, 
creating state interests, with the parties and the occurrence or transaction.” 449 
U.S. 302, 308 (1981). In the common law climate actions, however, this 
requirement is easily satisfied because both foreign oil companies regularly do 
business within California and New York. New York Am. Compl., supra note 18, 
at 10–16; Oakland Am. Compl., supra note 18, at 11–25. The District courts, in 
lieu of analyzing these clearly satisfied Due Process requirements, apply the 
arguably more appropriate limits on extraterritoriality. City of New York v. BP 
21
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Instead of invoking the presumption against extraterritoriality 
and prematurely dismissing these claims, the district courts 
should have proceeded to perform a choice-of-law analysis to 
determine the applicability of U.S. law. Although the choice-of-law 
analysis appears separate and disconnected from the viability of 
applying the common law extraterritorially, performing the choice-
of-law analysis highlights certain aspects of the climate nuisance 
actions which further support the extraterritorial application of 
the common law in such suits. 
IV. CHOICE-OF-LAW PRINCIPLES DICTATE THE 
USE OF U.S. LAW IN CLIMATE NUISANCE 
SUITS 
Instead of invoking extraterritoriality to dismiss the climate 
nuisance suits, state and federal district courts should proceed to 
employ choice-of-law rules and traditional common law principles 
to determine the source and content of the legal rights and 
obligations implicated by overseas conduct that causes domestic 
harm to U.S. residents.124 Because the district courts’ 
determination to apply federal common law is currently pending 
on appeal and may be reversed,125 the following section discusses 
how choice-of-law principles dictate the utilization of U.S. law in 
the context of both federal and state common law. 
A. Federal Common Law 
When claims arising under the federal common law conflict 
with another body of law, federal courts in general apply the law 
of the jurisdiction with the greatest interest in the litigation.126 
 
P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 
325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1025 (N.D. Cal 2018). 
124. See, e.g., Ajuba Int’l, LLC v. Saharia, 871 F. Supp. 2d 671, 681 (E.D. 
Mich. 2012) (tortious conduct committed in foreign country caused harm in 
Michigan and was actionable under Michigan tort law); In re Agent Orange 
Product Liability Litigation, 635 F.2d 987, 994–95 (2d Cir. 1980) (state tort law 
applies to claims brought by Vietnam War veterans injured by wartime use of 
chemical herbicides). 
125. Appellate Brief, supra note 30; see also Appellant Brief, City of Oakland 
v. BP P.L.C., No. 18-16663 (9th Cir. Mar. 13, 2019).  
126. Eli Lilly do Brasil, Ltda. v. Fed. Express Corp., 502 F.3d 78, 81 (2d Cir. 
2007) (quoting In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A., 961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 
1992)) [hereinafter “Eli Lilly”]. 
22https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/5
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This regularly involves the employment of the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws.127 Under the Restatement, where 
actions involve injury to property, “the local law of the state where 
the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the 
parties unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other 
state has a more significant relationship . . . .”128 The Restatement 
outlines seven factors to analyze when determining if a forum has 
a “more significant relationship” than the forum where the injury 
occurred: 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the 
relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other 
interested states and the relative interests of those states in the 
determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified 
expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field 
of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) 
ease in the determination and application of the law to be 
applied.129 
Factors (d), (e), and (f), however, are of lesser importance in the 
field of torts, because “persons who cause injury on nonprivileged 
occasions, particularly when the injury is unintentionally caused, 
usually act without giving thought to the law that may be applied 
to determine the legal consequences of this conduct.”130 These 
parties retain low justified expectations with respect to choice-of-
law principles, so the protection of these expectations play only a 
minute role in a choice-of-law analysis.131 Consequently, the 
remaining factors – (a), (b), (c), and (g) –become more significant in 
the analysis.132 Special weight, however, is given to subsection (a) 
– the needs of the interstate and international systems – where the 
issue would be resolved differently under laws of each interested 
state.133 
 
127. See e.g., id. at 81; In re Sterba, 852 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2017). 
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 147 (AM. LAW INST. 
1971); see also Harris v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 820 F.2d 1000, 1003–04 (9th Cir. 
1987) (noting that the Restatement “creates a presumption that the law of the 
place where the injury occurred applies”). 
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2).  
130. Id. at § 145 cmt. b. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at § 145 cmt. d. 
23
   
200 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
1. Maintaining the International System 
One concern with allowing U.S. law to govern is the possibility 
that “[h]uge United States tort judgments could trigger similar 
adverse foreign reactions because the judgment could bankrupt or 
financially cripple the foreign defendant and, in some cases, 
undercut employment and the economy of the foreign country.”134 
But when a foreign entity engages in commercial activity with the 
purpose of deriving substantial profits from the U.S. market, it 
arguably assumes the risk of having U.S. law applied to tortious 
conduct that caused injury to the country.135 In the current climate 
proceedings, both Royal Dutch Shell and BP perform substantial 
business within both California and New York, including the 
production, marketing, and sale of fossil fuels.136 Therefore, even 
though these oil companies are headquartered abroad, the 
presence of numerous contacts within California and New York 
suggest that the international systems will remain intact with the 
application of U.S. law over that of the foreign nations. 
The maintenance of the international system is further 
supported by the European Union’s (“E.U.”) Rome II Regulation.137 
An important consideration for the first factor explores whether 
the foreign forum’s choice-of-law analysis differs from that of the 
local forum because the needs of the interstate system may become 
imbalanced through the utilization of the local forum’s laws.138 For 
E.U. member states, including the United Kingdom (“U.K.”) and 
the Netherlands,139 the Rome II Regulation provides that “the law 
 
134. Luther L. McDougal III, Toward the Increased Use of Interstate and 
International Policies in Choice-of-Law Analysis in Tort Cases Under the Second 
Restatement and Leflar’s Choice-Influencing Considerations, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2465, 
2480 (1996).  
135. Id. at 2482. 
136. New York Am. Compl., supra note 18, at 10–13, 19–22; Oakland Am. 
Compl., supra note 18, at 11–12, 21–23. 
137. See Regulation 864/2007, of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 11 July 2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Rome II), 
2007 O.J. (L 199) 40, 44 (EC) [hereinafter Rome II Regulation]. 
138. See e.g., Harris v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 820 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 
1987) (“Choosing Poland’s damages law facilitates the working of the 
international system because Poland would apply the same law under its choice-
of-law rule, lex loci delicti.”).  
139. Countries in the EU and EEA, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/eu-eea 
[https://perma.cc/5R58-L45J]. Although the U.K. has attempted unsuccessfully to 
leave the E.U. numerous times, because its withdrawal appears nonexistent in 
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applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a 
tort/delict shall be the law of the country in which the damage 
occurs irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to 
the damage occurred . . . .”140 Although not applicable to the U.S., 
the Rome II regulation is some evidence that the E.U. accepts the 
traditional application of an injured forum’s law, suggesting that 
the E.U. does not have a strong interest in applying a contrary rule. 
Accordingly, the first factor weighs in favor of utilizing U.S. law in 
the context of climate nuisance actions. 
2. Relevant Policies and Interests of Each 
Sovereign Nation 
In determining the extent of each parties’ interest in tort 
actions, courts have employed a three-step analysis: (1) identify the 
particular rule of law in each state, (2) identify the purposes or 
policies underlying each rule, and (3) assess the extent to which 
application of each rule in the current context will further such 
policy.141 The U.S. and U.K. nuisance laws are nearly identical in 
language and structure, essentially both revolve around the 
protection of a state’s people from localized property 
interference.142 And because the U.S. nuisance law developed from 
its U.K. counterpart,143 the purposes of each can be fairly equated. 
This is further supported by the main consideration of reviewing 
each parties’ interests, which allows courts to scrutinize conflicting 
laws when one law absolves an individual of liability while the 
 
the near future, it is quite likely that the adjudications of the climate nuisance 
actions will be completed beforehand. 
140. Rome II Regulation, supra note 137, at 44–45 (“The law applicable to a 
non-contractual obligation arising out of environmental damage or damage 
sustained by persons or property as a result of such damage shall be the law 
determined pursuant to Article 4(1), unless the person seeking compensation for 
damage chooses to base his or her claim on the law of the country in which the 
event giving rise to the damage occurred.”). 
141. See, e.g., Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1299 (11th 
Cir. 1999). 
142. See The Law Commission, Simplification of Criminal Law: Public 
Nuisance and Outraging Public Decency, at 5, COM (2015), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/atta
chment_data/file  [https://perma.cc/6DBK-UECN] [hereinafter The Law 
Commission]. 
143. Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox 
of the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L. Q. 755, 767 (2001). 
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other imposes liability.144 In the current climate nuisance actions, 
with respect to the conflict between U.S. and U.K. law, there is no 
such dichotomy; rather, each jurisdiction employs a multi-factored 
analysis to determine whether the alleged nuisance is 
actionable.145 
The conflict between U.S. and Dutch law is not as clear-cut. 
Because the Netherlands does not possess a comprehensive 
nuisance law framework that parallels that of the U.S.,146 a quick 
comparative analysis appears unattainable. However, the 
Netherlands, through its judiciary, has recently mandated a 
policy-shift towards fewer greenhouse gas emissions because 
climate change is currently, and will continue to negatively impact, 
numerous local interests of the Dutch people.147 Therefore, 
applying the U.S. law in the current climate actions will not cause 
conflicts with the Dutch policy because the nature of the climate 
nuisance suits is to allow recovery for localized harms caused by 
the production, marketing, and sale of the fossil fuels which 
produce greenhouse gases. Consequently, this factor does not 
weigh in favor of applying U.K. or Dutch law when adjudicating 
the current climate actions. 
3. Ease in Applying U.S. Law 
It has long been accepted that there is a risk of courts 
misapplying unfamiliar law.148 Even though U.K. nuisance law 
has a similar framework to U.S. nuisance law, U.S. courts will still 
be required to comprehend and correctly apply foreign law, which 
still imposes some risk of misapplication. With respect to Dutch 
law, the risk is significantly magnified because the Netherlands 
 
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS  § 6 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 
1971).  
145. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see 
The Law Commission, supra note 142, at 6–7. 
146. See generally Art. 6:178 para. f BW. (Neth.), translated in Dutch Civil 
Code: Book 6 The Law of Obligations, DUTCHCIVILLAW.COM, 
http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/legislation/dcctitle6633.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8KPY-VXWP] [hereinafter Dutch Civil Code]. 
147. Urgenda Decision, supra note 106, at 50 ¶4.89 (upholding the lower 
court’s reasoning expressly grounded in the Dutch law of hazardous negligence). 
148. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 745–49 (1988) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (determining that a Kansas court incorrectly applied 
the laws of another state). 
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does not have a public nuisance framework. Consequently, even 
though California and New York brought their claims under the 
public nuisance doctrines, applying Dutch law would require the 
courts to divert from the familiar common law framework to one of 
civil law. The potential for misapplication illustrates the difficulty 
of applying foreign law and highlights the ease of applying U.S. 
law. With all relevant factors overwhelmingly weighing in favor of 
applying U.S. law, the federal common law, as opposed to U.K. and 
Dutch law, must govern. 
B. State Common Law 
When federal courts sit in diversity, however, they must 
conform to the conflict of law principles prevailing in the state.149 
Because there are currently two climate nuisance suits attempting 
to apply state law – in California and New York – and because each 
state utilizes a unique choice-of-law framework, this section 
analyzes both states. 
1. California 
“California courts employ a ‘governmental interest analysis’ to 
assess whether California law or non-forum law should 
apply. . . .”150 The governmental interest analysis comprises three 
general steps: (1) determine whether the laws of the conflicting 
forums actually differ from one another; (2) if there is a difference, 
examine each jurisdiction’s interest in applying its law to 
determine if a conflict truly exists; and, (3) if there is a true conflict, 
“carefully evaluate[] the nature and strength” of each jurisdiction’s 
interest in the application of its own law “‘to determine which 
state’s interest would be more impaired if its policy were 
subordinated to the policy of the other state’ and then ultimately 
 
149. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1002 (2d Cir. 1989) (“A federal court 
sitting in diversity or adjudicating state law claims that are pendent to a federal 
claim must apply the choice of law rules of the forum state.”); Moore v. Greene, 
431 F.2d 584, 589–90 (9th Cir. 1970) (same).  
150. Paulsen v. CNF Inc., 559 F.3d 1061, 1080 (9th Cir. 2009); Reich v. 
Purcell, 432 P.2d 727, 729 (Cal. 1967) (“[W]hen application of the law of the place 
of the wrong would defeat the interests of the litigants and of the states concerned, 
we have not applied that law.”). 
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appl[y] ‘the law of the state whose interest would be more impaired 
if its law were not applied.’”151 
In California, the state essentially follows the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts with respect to public nuisance.152 Public 
nuisance is described as a substantial and unreasonable 
interference to collective social interests, including “‘the public 
health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the 
public convenience.’”153 The requirements of a substantial and 
unreasonable interference can be further explained. First, a 
“substantial” interference is one that causes “significant harm,” 
defined as “harm of importance . . .  a real and appreciable invasion 
of the plaintiff’s interests . . . and an invasion that is definitely 
offensive, seriously annoying or intolerable.”154 This element is 
governed by an objective standard, following what “persons of 
normal health and sensibilities living in the same community” 
would believe.155 Second, to determine if an interference is 
“unreasonable,” the reviewing court examines “whether the 
gravity of the harm outweighs the social utility of the defendant’s 
conduct, [by] taking a number of factors into account.”156 This 
determination is likewise an objective one, which is typically 
decided by the factfinders in a specific case.157 
In the U.K., public nuisance is nearly identical in nature. 
Similar to its U.S. counterpart, U.K. law characterizes public 
nuisance as “‘suffering of common injury by members of the public 
by interference with rights enjoyed by them as such.’”158 Although 
the language of the U.K. public nuisance doctrine does not 
perfectly mirror that of California’s public nuisance doctrine, it can 
still be considered “the same” with respect to the choice-of-law 
 
151. McCann v. Foster Wheeler LLC., 225 P.3d 516, 527 (Cal. 2010) (quoting 
Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 137 P.3d 914, 922 (Cal. 2006)). 
152. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 604–05 (Cal. 1997).  
153. Id. at 604.  
154. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 669, 696 (Cal. 
1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 821F (AM. LAW INST. 1977)). 
155. Id. (citing PROSSER & KEETON, TORTS § 88 (5th ed. 1984)).  
156. Id. at 697 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826–831 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1977)). 
157. Id. 
158. The Law Commission, supra note 142, at 5.  
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analysis.159 Therefore, because the U.K. law and California both 
define public nuisance as an interference with a right common to 
the general public, there is no conflict and California law 
governs.160 
In the Netherlands, there is no specific public nuisance 
doctrine which parallels that in California.161 Consequently, the 
laws of the U.S. cannot be identical to those of the Netherlands, 
forcing a reviewing court to move to the second criterion: examine 
each jurisdiction’s interest in applying its law to determine if a 
conflict truly exists. First and foremost, although Royal Dutch 
Shell is headquartered in the Netherlands, it performs vast 
activities within U.S. boundaries, including selling, producing, and 
marketing fossil fuels as well as pouring millions of dollars into 
lobbying campaigns.162 In California, more interactions with a 
certain forum translates to that forum having a larger interest in 
the matter.163 Not only was California the location of the harm, but 
California was also home to numerous Royal Dutch Shell 
operations. 
Additionally, in the Netherlands, modern policy has trended 
towards the minimization of fossil fuels to abate the effects of 
climate change by reducing carbon emissions and to adapt to the 
already changing climate.164 Consequently, allowing the localized 
 
159. Paulsen v. CNF Inc., 559 F.3d 1061, 1081 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that 
because the law of the foreign forum generally does not conflict with the current 
forum, there is no conflict under California’s choice of law analysis).  
160. This further supports the argument that extraterritoriality should not 
be an issue in the context of common law climate nuisance suits. See discussion 
infra Section IV.C. 
161. See Dutch Civil Code, supra note 146. 
162. Oakland Am. Compl., supra note 18, at 9, 21; Niall McCarthy, Oil and 
Gas Giants Spend Millions Lobbying to Block Climate Change Policies 
[Infographic], FORBES (Mar. 25, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2019/03/25/oil-and-gas-giants-spend-
millions-lobbying-to-block-climate-change-policies-
infographic/?fbclid=IwAR31OeH2e6q6S-
vCF_fglBQnZqMFbZVtowmq5MvOBSXbsI7sBEm2cbaM-gw#1a82fa987c4f 
[https://perma.cc/6X68-3Z4H]. 
163. See Havlicek v. Coast-to-Coast Analytical Servs., Inc., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
696, 700 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (“Delaware’s interest in regulating the activities of 
its domestic corporations is less substantial where, as here, its only contact with 
the corporation is in issuing a certificate of incorporation.”). 
164. See Dutch Vision on Global Climate Action, GOV’T.NL, 
https://www.government.nl/topics/climate-change/dutch-vision-on-global-
climate-action [https://perma.cc/37PR-5CST]. 
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recovery in the California climate nuisance action will not impair 
the climate-friendly policies of the Netherlands.165 Thus, if state 
law governs in the context of the recent climate nuisance actions, 
California’s choice-of-law framework dictates the utilization of 
California state law. 
2. New York 
New York has adopted a “greater interest” analysis whereby 
the law of the jurisdiction which has the “greatest concern with the 
specific issue raised in the litigation[]” applies.166 To determine 
which law controls under this standard, the reviewing court must 
evaluate each jurisdiction’s relationship or contact with the 
occurrence of events or the parties.167 
New York, like California, follows the Restatement of Torts 
and defines a public nuisance as “conduct . . . which offend[s], 
interfere[s] with or cause[s] damage to the public in the exercise of 
rights common to all.”168 Consequently, New York nuisance law is 
nearly identical to the nuisance law of the U.K..169 With respect to 
the Netherlands, however, the nuisance laws do not match because 
the Netherlands does not have a specific nuisance doctrine.170 This 
difference does not matter, though, because in cases involving the 
interference with property rights, the New York Court of Appeals 
has determined it “almost unthinkable” to apply the law of some 
other location than the law where the property is located.171 
The logic is simple in the climate nuisance context: New York 
has experienced significant damages as a result of oil companies’ 
 
165. See Havlicek, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 700 (referencing the consideration 
given to each state’s interest in the application of its respective policies).  
166. Cooney v. Osgood Mach., Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277, 280 (N.Y. 1993) (quoting 
Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283 (N.Y. 1963)).  
167. Id. 
168. Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co., 362 N.E.2d 968, 971 (N.Y. 
1977). 
169. See supra notes 142–143 and accompanying text.  
170. See generally Dutch Civil Code, supra note 146. This is further 
supported by the analysis performed in the Urgenda Decision whereby the court 
did not invoke a nuisance doctrine but instead utilized other fields of law to 
protect public rights injured by greenhouse gas emissions. See Urgenda Decision, 
supra note 106.   
171. Heaney v. Purdy, 272 N.E.2d 550, 551 (N.Y. 1971) (quoting Babcock, 
191 N.E.2d at 284). 
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contribution to climate change. The houses, schools, hospitals, and 
livelihoods of the New York population have been put at serious 
risk because of the actions of the oil companies. Consequently, the 
city has expended mass amounts of funds to prevent any rapid 
deterioration. Therefore, New York must have a greater interest in 
the matter than the countries located thousands of miles away 
from the localized harms, and New York law must apply to the 
climate nuisance suit brought in the Southern District. 
C. The Choice-of-Law Analyses Further Support the 
Extraterritorial Application of the Common Law in 
Climate Actions. 
Even though the current procedural posture of the climate 
actions involves the determination of whether the federal common 
law or the respective state common law applies,172 in either 
situation, choice-of-law principles dictate the use of U.S. law.173 
This determination, although typically considered after 
justiciability analyses,174 shines relevant light on whether 
allowing the extraterritoriality of the common law in climate 
actions violates separation of powers principles. 
With respect to the British corporation BP, federal, California, 
and New York public nuisance law does not present a conflict with 
its U.K. counterpart.175 Logically, the district courts’ broad 
generalization that the extraterritorial application of the common 
law creates “serious foreign policy consequences” is unfounded.176 
Even with respect to the Royal Dutch Shell where a more 
traditional conflict of laws arises, the volume and depth of interests 
felt by the U.S. and its respective states overwhelm the minority of 
 
172. Although this determination will affect the justiciability of the climate 
actions against foreign oil companies, the main purpose of appealing this issue is 
to prevent the Clean Air Act’s preemption of the federal common law. See 
Appellant Brief, supra note 30, at 43–47; Brief for Appellants at 34–42, City of 
Oakland v. BP P.L.C., No. 18-16663 (9th Cir. Mar. 13, 2019). 
173. See discussion supra Section IV.A–B. 
174. See, e.g., Neely v. Club Med Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 63 F.3d 166, 174–80 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (performing a choice of law analysis after determining that the court 
had subject matter jurisdiction); Floyd v. CIBC World Mkts., Inc., 426 B.R. 622, 
633–641 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (performing a choice of law analysis after determining 
that the parties had proper standing). 
175. See discussion supra Section IV.A–B.  
176. City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).  
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interests of the Netherlands.177 Coupled with the intense climate 
mitigation and adaptation efforts pursued by the Netherlands,178 
the presence of “serious foreign policy consequences” appears 
inapposite. In the context of climate nuisance actions, then, the 
district courts’ omission of a choice-of-law analysis caused the 
courts to overstate the relevant foreign policy concerns and to 
invoke inapt Supreme Court precedent. Therefore, in addition to 
determining that U.S. law governs in common law climate 
nuisance actions, the choice-of-law analysis further supports the 
extraterritorial application of the common law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
More and more, municipalities are turning to the common law 
in search of remedies for the damages caused by climate change. 
Judges are consistently dismissing these actions, often by offering 
less than convincing reasons as to why these actions cannot 
proceed on the merits. The district courts’ findings in the City of 
New York and the City of Oakland cases demonstrate the most 
recent attack on allowing the adjudication of climate actions on 
their merits. The utilization of the statutory presumption against 
extraterritoriality to bar the common law’s reach to foreign oil 
companies, however, stands on shaky grounds due to the common 
law’s significant variation from its statutory counterpart. As this 
Note has illustrated, the U.S. district courts’ reliance on Supreme 
Court precedent involving statutory law plays no role in the 
extraterritorial application of the common law. 
This Note goes a step further in completing the final analysis 
before reaching the merits of the case – determining which law 
applies. By reviewing the choice-of-law principles in conjunction 
with U.S. law, U.K. law, and Dutch law, the mandate to apply U.S. 
law further supports the extraterritorial application of the common 
law because it demonstrates the lack of conflicting laws and 
policies between the three sovereign nations. Because issues of 
 
177. See discussion supra Section IV.A–B. 
178. See Dutch Vision on Global Climate Action, supra note 164.  
32https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss1/5
  
2019] EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN CLIMATE ACTIONS 209 
standing179 and political question180 in the context of climate suits 
have already been resolved, the choice-of-law analysis represents 
the final jurisdictional hurdle the district courts must overcome 
before reviewing the cities’ claims against the foreign oil companies 
on the merits. By understanding that in the context of common law 
climate actions U.S. law – whether federal or state – applies, there 
is a stronger likelihood of the judiciary overcoming jurisdictional 
hurdles to decide the merits of these cases. The judiciary’s 
reticence to hear common law climate actions is concerning 
because the most significant effects of climate change have yet to 
come and the current global efforts to prevent such effects appear 
inadequate. 
 
 
179. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007) (determining that 
governmental entities have standing with respect to damages caused by climate 
change). 
180. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 332 (2d Cir. 2011), 
rev’d on other grounds, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (determining that although common 
law climate actions present difficult and complex questions, the suits do not 
present a nonjusticiable political question). 
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